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RECENT DECISIONS
to this case, defendants are guilty of criminal contempt though they
may be purged of civil contempt.' 4
Pleadings which fairly and completely apprise the defendants
of the charges against them, though on information and belief, and
which are not harmful to defendants by omission to specifically charge
them with criminal contempt under rule 42 (B) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 15 as shown by defendants' pleadings and actions,
are not prejudicial to defendants. 16
It is proper to try both civil and criminal contempt actions at
the same time if the defendants enjoy all of the protections that
would have been afforded them in a criminal contempt proceeding. 17
The United States may proceed as a party to civil proceedings
in controversies to which the United States shall be a party.' 8  This
includes allowing the United States to bring civil contempt
proceedings.
Sentences for criminal contempt are punitive' 9 and the court
may consider the extent of the wilful and deliberate defiance of the
court, the seriousness of the defendant's actions, and the public in-
terest. In sentencing for civil contempt the court has a twofold
purpose, to force defendant to comply with its order, and to com-
pensate the plaintiff for his losses; 20 therefore the magnitude of the
harm threatened and the probable effectiveness of the fine is
considered.
2
'
In its decision the court placed great emphasis on the threat to
orderly constitutional government and the economic and social wel-
fare of the nation as well as on the lack of respect shown for the
court by the defendants.
H. A. R.
NEGLIGENCE- LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNER FOR PERSONAL IN-
JURIES TO STEVEDORES EMPLOYED BY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.-
Plaintiffs, stevedores, contracted a dermatitis when handling leaky
steel drums containing cashew nut oil, which leaked out of the drums
and onto the deck while plaintiffs were unloading ship owned by
14 Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme C. Process Corp., 86 F. (2d) 727
(C. C. A. 2d 1936).
15FED. R. CRIm. P., 42 (b).
16 Conley v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th 1932); Kelly
v. United States, 250 Fed. 947 (C. C. A. 9th 1918).
17 Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 69 L. ed. 767 (1925); see
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 67, 69 L. ed. 162, 168 (1924).
Is McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61, 83 L. ed. 1103 (1939); REv.
STAT. §§563, 629 (1875), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §41 (1940).
'1 Gonpers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. ed. 797 (1911).20 Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Co., 284 U. S. 448, 76 L. ed. 389 (1932).
21 See In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157, 168, 22 L. ed. 819, 823 (U. S. 1874).
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defendant. The dock company employing plaintiffs knew the oil
was a corrosive which might cause such a dermatitis, but neither the
dock company nor the shipowner warned plaintiffs of this danger,
although the dock company kept a supply of special salve on the
premises to prevent such injury. Defendants claimed that since the
dock company employing plaintiffs knew of the danger, defendants
were under no duty to warn the stevedores. Jurisdiction was based
on diversity of citizenship. The suits were consolidated for trial
and were tried originally in the District Court of the United States,
Southern District of New York. Held, judgment for plaintiffs
affirmed. Defendants owed duty to plaintiffs as business visitors to
provide a safe place to work and to warn them of concealed dangers
of which it knew or could have known by exercise of reasonable care,
despite concurrent duty and knowledge on part of dock company and
latter's failure to warn plaintiffs. Anderson v. Kerr Steamship Co.,
- F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
The court based its decision on the following reasoning: A
shipowner owes a duty to stevedores employed by an independent
contractor, as business visitors, not only of providing a safe place to
work,' but also of furnishing a seaworthy ship, since it has been
held that this traditional protection afforded seamen by admiralty
extends also to stevedores.2 The oil leaking from the drums onto
the deck made the place of work unsafe. Furthermore, the cargo
was itself dangerous and cargo which is a hazard to workers handling
it makes the place of work unsafe.3 This duty may not be delegated, 4
and persists despite the fact that there is a concurrent duty on the
part of the dock company.5 The measure of care in such a case is
the same as that which is due from an employer to his employees.0
Therefore, defendan ts should at least have warned plaintiffs of latent
dangers of which plaintiffs did not know or which they could not be
Fodera v. Booth Am. Shipping Corp., 159 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 2d
1947); The Dallem, 41 F. Supp. 718 (D. Mass. 1941); The S. S. Anderson,
37 F. Supp. 695 (D. Md. 1941); The Wearpool, 112 F. (2d) 245 (C. C. A.
5th 1940) ; The No. 34, 25 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 2d 1928) ; The Joseph B.
Thomas, 86 Fed. 658 (C. C. A. 9th 1898).
2 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 90 L. ed. 809 (1946);
Fodera v. Booth Am. Shipping Corp., 159 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 2d 1947);
see W. J. McCahan Co. v. Stoffel, 41 F. (2d) 651, 654 (C. C. A. 3d 1930).
s La Guerra v. Brasileiro, 124 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
4Vanderlinden v. Lorentzen, 139 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 2d 1944); Scio-
laro v. Asch, 198 N. Y. 77, 91 N. E. 263 (1910).
5 Puleo v. H-. E. Moss & Co., 159 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d 1947); Van-
derlinden v. Lorentzen, 139 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 2d 1944); Grillo v. Royal
Norwegian Gov't, 139 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) ; La Guerra v. Brasi-
leiro, 124 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
6 Puleo v. H. E. Moss & Co., 159 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d 1947);
Aurigemma v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha Co., 238 N. Y. 183, 144 N. E. 495 (1924);
Lyman v. Putnam Coal & Ice Co., 182 App. Div. 705, 169 N. Y. Supp. 984
(2d Dep't 1918); Casey v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 128 App. Div. 86, 112 N. Y.
Supp. 522 (2d Dep't 1908).
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reasonably expected to discover,7 but which were within defendants'
knowledge. Knowledge on part of defendants includes not only that
which is actually known, but also that which defendants could by the
exercise of reasonable care have learned about the condition and
nature of the cargo.8 Knowledge so imputable to defendants is also
a factor to be given effect in determining the extent of their obliga-
tion to protect the cargo. This duty exists, however, only when the
owner has present control over the vessel. Therefore Freeman v.
A. H. Bull S. S. Co.9 is distinguishable from the present case. In
that case the vessel was under charter to another, so that the owner
had no control over the loading and unloading of the ship, or any
knowledge of the condition of the cargo.
The court, however, did not discuss defendants' contention that
since the contractor knew of the danger, and this is unquestionable
as the evidence revealed that a special ointment was kept on the
premises by the dock company for the prevention of such a derma-
titis, the ship company was absolved from the duty to warn the
stevedores. The factual situation here is rather unusual. In the
majority of cases where liability has been imposed on a shipowner
for injuries to stevedores employed by a contractor, the defects caus-
ing the injury were within the peculiar knowledge of the owner, such
as faulty machinery or cargo booms, which could not reasonably be
discovered by one not familiar with the mechanical condition of the
ship. The duty upon a contractor, as employer, extends only to
known or ascertainable hazards. In most of the cases where lia-
bility attached despite a finding that a concurrent duty existed in
the contractor, the problem of actual knowledge on contractor's part
did not arise.
La Guerra v. Brasileiro 10 is somewhat analogous on the point
of knowledge. There a shipowner was held liable as injury was
caused by faulty stowage of cargo. However, it appears that con-
tractor's foreman discovered the danger shortly before the injury
occurred and did not order stoppage of work until the situation could
be remedied. The facts there, however, differ from the case under
discussion in that there the owner was not aware of the contractor's
knowledge-of the defect. In Sagler v. Kellogg S. S. Corp." a ship-
owner supplied a cleaning fluid to contractor for use by contractor's
men in cleaning ship tanks. The shipowner had advised contractor
in the use of the fluid, warning him that it was a dangerous sub-
stance if not properly used. It was held there that the shipowner
7 Puleo v. H. E. Moss & Co., 159 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d 1947); The
Anderson, 37 F. Supp. 695 (D. Md. 1941); The Dalhem, 41 F. Supp. 718
(D. Mass. 1941); PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67 (1941).
8 Williams S. S. Co. v. Wilbur, 9 F. (2d) 622 (C. C. A. 9th 1925).
9 125 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 5th 1942).
10 124 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
11155 Misc. 217, 277 N. Y. Supp. 792 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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had a right to rely on the contractor's warning his men of the dan-
gerous nature of the compound, but if the shipowner knew that the
men had actually not been told, or if the evidence established facts
which would have led a reasonable man to inquire, there was never-
theless then a concurrent duty on the shipowner to advise contrac-
tor's workers. Here, then, even though the duty was based sub-
stantially on the doctrine of a supplier of dangerous chattels,' 2 the
duty was nevertheless made contingent upon knowledge that the
contractor had not himself taken proper precautions. In the present
case the court did not go into the question of whether or not the
shipowner knew that the men had not been warned.
It may be that the doctrine of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki'3
could be extended to cover this situation. There it was held that
longshoremen are seamen in the sense that a shipowner owes them
the duty of furnishing a seaworthy ship. "Where there is a failure
in the discharge of the obligation of seaworthiness, liability follows
regardless of negligence," 14 so that this is actually a form of lia-
bility without fault. This doctrine is novel and has not been inter-
preted to any great extent as yet. It may be the courts will construe
the duty upon shipowners towards stevedores to be an absolute duty
regardless of any concurrent duty or knowledge in other connected
parties. On the other hand, one of the reasons offered by the court
for adopting this view was that the contractor in that case had neither
the right nor opportunity to discover or remove the cause of peril.
A. G. K.
TORTS-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF TEMPORAL DAMAGES IS
CAUSE OF ACTION- REQUIRES LEGAL JUSTIFICATION BY DEFEN-
DANTS.-The Advance Music Corporation is engaged in the business
of publishing musical compositions. Deriving its income from sales
of sheet music to the general public, music jobbers, motion picture
studios, etc., it advertises extensively to promote the popularity of
its songs. Sheet music is handled on a consignment basis by jobbers
and premature return means severe loss of business to the plaintiff.
The defendants, the American Tobacco Company and an advertising
concern, are creators of a weekly commercial radio program with a
widespread audience, which program is known as "Your Hit Parade"
and which purports to present the ten most popular songs of the
week. The defendants also circulate weekly lists of these songs
12 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
13328 U. S. 85, 90 L. ed. 809 (1946).
1 Fodera v. Booth Am. Shipping Corp., 159 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 2d
1947).
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